Shadowing Ministers: Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments by Carroll, Royce & Cox, Gary W.
Comparative Political Studies
45(2) 220 –236
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission: 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010414011421309
http://cps.sagepub.com
421309 CPS45210.1177/0010414011421309C
arroll and CoxComparative Political Studies
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission: 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
1Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
2Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Royce Carroll, Department of Political Science, MS 24, Rice University, 
PO Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892 
Email: rcarroll@rice.edu
Shadowing Ministers: 
Monitoring Partners in 
Coalition Governments
Royce Carroll1 and Gary W. Cox2
Abstract
In this article the authors study delegation problems within multiparty coalition 
governments. They argue that coalition parties can use the committee system to 
“shadow” the ministers of their partners; that is, they can appoint committee 
chairs from other governing parties, who will then be well placed to moni-
tor and/or check the actions of the corresponding ministers. The authors 
analyze which ministers should be shadowed if governing parties seek to 
minimize the aggregate policy losses they suffer as the result of ministers pur-
suing their own parties’ interests rather than the coalition’s. Based on data 
from 19 mostly European parliamentary democracies, the authors find that the 
greater the policy disagreement between a minister’s party and its partners, 
the more likely the minister is to be shadowed.
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A growing literature addresses delegation problems within multiparty coalition 
governments, especially the problem of controlling cabinet ministers 
(Andeweg, 2000; Hallerberg, 2000; Martin & Vanberg, 2005; Müller, 2000; 
Thies, 2001). A coalition of parties may agree on a compromise coalitional 
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policy in principle, yet not be able to trust one another’s ministers to imple-
ment that policy in practice. For example, if ministers’ efforts substantially 
affect the efficacy of government policies in their jurisdictions, and their efforts 
are difficult to observe, then delegating to ministers can be problematic.
The literature suggests three ways in which coalition partners might moni-
tor one another to reduce the “agency loss” each incurs from delegating to the 
other(s). First, Martin and Vanberg (2005) argue that partners can use the par-
liamentary process in general as an arena in which to learn about each other’s 
actions. Second, Müller and Strøm (2001) and Thies (2001) argue that junior 
ministers from one party can help keep tabs on cabinet ministers of another 
party. Third, Hallerberg (2000) and Kim and Loewenberg (2005) suggest that 
committees and/or their chairs can monitor ministers.
In this article, we first reconsider why and how ministers might be moni-
tored or—as we shall also say, shadowed—by their coalition partners.1 The 
empirical portion of the article then focuses on whether, and under what condi-
tions, coalition members utilize committee chairs to monitor cabinet ministers, 
providing systematic data and analyses from 19 parliamentary assemblies.
Previous analyses (Kim & Loewenberg, 2005; Thies, 2001) have investi-
gated whether the percentage of ministers shadowed is greater than would be 
expected by chance alone. We go beyond this aggregate evidence to deter-
mine which specific ministries in each coalition should be shadowed, given 
the policy positions of the parties. If governing coalitions allocate chairs by 
taking turns (e.g., first Party 1 chooses a chair, then Party 2 chooses a chair, and 
so on in some fixed order until all the government chairs are filled), and each 
partner chooses which chairs it will take to minimize agency losses, then a 
given minister should be more likely to be shadowed when the ministerial 
party has more serious policy disagreements in the ministry’s jurisdiction 
with the other governing parties. We provide evidence for both of our 
predictions.
Delegating to Cabinet Ministers
Many scholars conceive of parliamentary government as a chain of delegation 
relationships, with voters delegating to MPs, MPs delegating to the cabinet as 
a whole, the cabinet delegating to ministers, and ministers delegating to senior 
bureaucrats (e.g., Andeweg, 2000; Müller, 2000; Strøm, 2000). At each point 
in the chain, the question arises as to what the principals can do to ensure that 
their agents perform in their (the principals’) interests. Should the principals 
pay the costs of monitoring their agents, and, if so, what sort of monitoring 
system should they devise?
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One possibility, of course, is that coalition governments are better off not 
paying any costs to monitor their ministers, instead leaving them to pursue 
whatever policies they individually favor. When each governing party knows 
each other’s ideal policies, such “mutual surrender of control” can lead to stable 
policy outcomes (Laver & Shepsle, 1996). However, it can also be a recipe 
for fiscal common pool problems, leading to excessive spending (Bawn & 
Rosenbluth, 2006; Hallerberg, 2000; Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 2007). 
More generally, all members of the coalition could in principle be made better 
off, were the coalition able costlessly to enforce a compromise policy (rather 
than resort to the “mutual surrender of control” outcome).
Even if enforcement is not costless, coalition members may still be bet-
ter off paying those costs, if being able to implement a compromise policy 
is sufficiently valuable. Assuming that the value of compromise is sufficient, 
what might a cost-effective system to regulate ministerial behavior in multi-
party coalitions look like?
As several scholars have pointed out, such a system would not entail 
empowering the prime minister to whip the ministers into line because the 
prime minister must necessarily be from a single party and the other parties 
in the coalition would have little reason to believe that the premier would act 
faithfully in pursuit of coalition-wide, as opposed to party-specific, benefits 
(Andeweg, 2000; Müller, Philipp, & Gerlich, 1993). Delegation to a powerful 
finance minister to curb the spending appetites of the other ministers would 
run afoul of the same problem (Hallerberg, 2000).
More plausible systems of delegation would entail some sort of collective 
leadership—whether the entire cabinet, an inner cabinet, or a “coalition com-
mittee” composing both ministers and extraparliamentary party leaders—
charged with ensuring that individual ministers comply with the coalition 
agreement on policy (cf. Andeweg, 2000). Yet the story does not end here 
because the collective leadership, whatever form it takes, will not wish to 
review all ministerial proposals and actions themselves. Such comprehensive 
“police patrol” oversight would be far too costly (cf. Martin & Vanberg, 
2005; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Instead, the collective leadership 
would set up a system of review through which ministerial proposals must 
proceed and empower key agents in that system with the power to delay 
legislation and blow whistles, thus giving the collective leadership time to 
review those pieces of legislation that have been flagged as possibly 
objectionable.
The role of bill-delayer and/or whistle-blower might in principle fall to 
various agents. Two of the most prominent candidates are junior ministers 
and committee chairs. Junior ministers may not have any special ability to 
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delay bills in the legislative process, but they are well positioned to acquire 
inside information about what is actually happening in the bowels of their 
ministry. They can thus provide advance information to their superiors in the 
cabinet, who can then register their complaints in a more informed way. 
Alternatively, junior ministers may leak information to committee chairs, 
who can then slow down bills that have already reached the assembly, giving 
coalition partners time to negotiate their differences. Either way, a system using 
junior ministers as monitors should exhibit a distinctive pattern of appointment, 
with juniors drawn from different parties than their seniors.
Here we explore in greater depth how committee chairs may serve as coun-
terweights to cabinet ministers. This becomes more plausible the more spe-
cialized committees are (e.g., so that the defense chair is a former or potential 
future defense minister); the better informed committees are (e.g., having bet-
ter rights to extract information from their corresponding ministries), and the 
more powerful committee chairs are (having greater power to delay or expe-
dite business referred to their committees). One case in which counterbalanc-
ing seems plausible is Sweden, about which Hagevi (2000) writes, “During 
the preparation of a government bill in . . . the Swedish Riksdag, the respon-
sible minister takes care to obtain the consent and strategic advice of represen-
tatives of the governing party on the relevant committee, particularly the 
chairman” (p. 238). If a chair-based monitoring system is in place, one again 
expects a distinct pattern in party control: Committee chairs should be drawn 
from different parties than the cabinet ministers they oversee (Kim & 
Loewenberg, 2005).
In the following sections, we investigate empirically whether committee 
chairs are in fact used as counterbalances. First, we describe how often com-
mittee chairs are assigned to parties other than the party of the corresponding 
cabinet ministers. Second, we analyze which ministries should be most likely 
to be shadowed by governing partners and test our theory using data from 19 
parliamentary assemblies.
Do Committees Parallel Ministries?
To begin our investigation, we need first to identify countries in which shad-
owing via committees is possible—where there is a reasonably close corre-
spondence between executive ministries and legislative committees. Mattson 
and Strøm (1995), in a study of West European parliaments, find that “most 
law-making committees have jurisdictions which are parallel to the ministe-
rial organization. It is, thus, possible to talk of a correspondence between 
committees and ministries” (p. 270). Crowther and Olson (2002) find legislative 
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committees paralleling executive ministries in most Eastern European legisla-
tures as well. We focus here on 19 parliamentary nations (10 Western European, 
8 Eastern European, and 1 former European colony) in which ministerial and 
committee jurisdictions generally correspond: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Sweden.
Administering and Overseeing Ministries
Operationally, our investigation starts at the level of a “jurisdictional area.” In 
many countries, ministries combine multiple areas of jurisdiction (e.g., a min-
istry of culture and sports) and committees do as well (e.g., a committee of 
trade and industry). We disaggregate all the ministerial and committee juris-
dictions in each country in our data set into a list of jurisdictional areas (e.g., 
culture, sports, trade, industry).2 For each jurisdictional area, we know the 
party of the relevant minister and the party of the relevant chair. We then 
aggregate the jurisdictions to the ministry level. We shall say that a party 
“administers” a ministry when a member of that party is the minister. A party 
“oversees” a ministry when a member of that party chairs the relevant 
committee(s). Shadowing here refers to any ministry overseen by a different 
governing party than the one administering it. To qualify as shadowed, at least 
half of the jurisdictional areas of a given ministry had to be controlled by 
committees chaired by another party.
In the average government in our sample, 86% of the ministries’ jurisdic-
tions are shared by corresponding standing committees in the assembly. Of 
these ministries, on average 32% were shadowed by a governing partner, 30% 
faced chairs held by opposition parties, and 34% faced chairs held by the 
minister’s party (i.e., were not shadowed).
In Table 1, we present an overview of the basic pattern of shadowing by 
governing partners in parliamentary regimes with multiparty governments.
The table shows that in 13 of the 19 countries we examine, among minis-
ters facing a chair from a governing party, the majority face a corresponding 
chair from another party.
Determinants of Shadowing
In our data set, there are 443 ministers from coalition governments formed in 
19 parliamentary countries between 2001 and 2007 (inclusive). Of these, we 
focus on the 310 ministers who faced a government chair—calling these 
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Table 1. Average Frequency of Committee Shadowing in 19 Assemblies
Country
Shadowed portion of 
government-overseen 
ministersa
Time period included 
(corresponding election 
years shown)
Australia 0.26 2001, 2004
Austria 0.61 2002, 2006
Belgium 0.36 2003, 2007
Bulgaria 0.56 2001, 2005
Czech Republic 0.60 2002, 2005
Denmark 0.35 2001, 2005
Estonia 0.92 2003, 2007
Finland 0.33 2003, 2007
Germany 0.64 2002, 2005
Hungary 0.62 2002, 2006
Iceland 0.25 2003, 2007
Italy 0.63 2001, 2006
Latvia 0.78 2002, 2006
Netherlands 0.56 2003, 2006
Norway 0.79 2001, 2005
Poland 0.41 2007
Slovakia 0.60 2006
Slovenia 0.50 2000, 2004
Sweden 0.53 2002, 2006
a.The proportion reported equals the number of ministers facing a chair from a government 
party, other than their own, on at least half of the shared jurisdictions, divided by the number 
of ministers facing a chair from any government party.
the government-overseen ministers—whose appointment would be most 
clearly influenced by preferences within the coalition. Some of these minis-
ters are shadowed (i.e., the minister faces a chair from a different governing 
party), the rest are not. What explains which government-overseen ministries 
are shadowed and which are not?
Two intuitive propositions are that a government-overseen minister is more 
likely to be shadowed by a chair from another governing party (a “partner”) if 
(a) the policy disagreements between the ministerial party and the partner 
are greater (on issues pertaining to the ministry’s jurisdiction) and (b) the 
chair has more influence over the ultimate policy outcomes in the ministry’s 
jurisdiction.
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We can conceive of two distinct ways to formalize these conjectures about 
shadowing. The first way would envision chairs as veto players and develop 
a model similar to those of Krehbiel (1998), Bawn (1999), Tsebelis (2002), 
or Cox and McCubbins (2005)—all of which describe how status quo poli-
cies map into final legislative enactments, when there are one or more veto 
players. In such a model, the value of shadowing a particular minister would 
be to affect the legislative outcome, and thus it would seem plausible that 
shadowing would be more likely when partners feared greater policy losses, 
were they to leave the ministerial party unchecked, and when chairs indeed 
had greater ability to influence the legislative outcome.
A second way to formalize the propositions stated above—and the one we 
take here—focuses not on policy making but on policy implementation. Every 
minister has a significant range of discretion—for example, in choosing which 
policies to enforce most vigorously, where to probe the limits of statutory 
intent, and how to exercise delegated rule-making authority. Formally, one 
can envision each minister i as having a multidimensional action space, Y
i
, 
from which she or he will choose an action vector, y
i
, representing her or his 
effort allocation, her or his interpretations of statutes, and her or his rule-
making decisions. In some polities, ministers may be free agents in choosing 
y
i
; in other polities, the corresponding committee chair in each policy area 
may exert considerable influence, so that y
i
 is a weighted average of the ideal 
points of the relevant minister and chair. To formalize this last point, let the 
ideal point of party j in jurisdiction Y
i
 be x
ji
, let m
i
 denote the party holding 
ministry i, and let c
i
 denote the party holding the corresponding chair i. Then 
y
i
 = λx
cii
 + (1-λ)x
mii
, where the weight of the committee chair is λ∈[0,.5] and
the weight of the minister is 1-λ.
In what follows, we imagine that there are two sorts of committee—weak 
and strong—with weak committees having weight λ
0
, strong committees 
having weight λ
1
, and 0 ≤ λ
0
 < λ
1
 ≤ .5. A version of the Laver-Shepsle (1996) 
0model emerges as the special case in which all committees are weak and λ
0
 = 
0. Thus, we follow Laver and Shepsle in assuming that policy in each juris-
diction will be decided by the officers with special responsibility in that juris-
diction but adopt a more expansive view of who the relevant officers are. We 
also focus on policy implementation by executive officials rather than policy 
making by legislators.
In the appendix, we present a simple model in which each party has addi-
tively separable utility over the implementation outcomes in the various min-
istries, and also directly values holding offices. We investigate the gain to a 
particular party in government when it chairs the committee over-
seeing ministry i, rather than allowing the ministerial party to chair that 
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committee—showing that this gain is a function of how much the partners 
disagree on how to implement the policies in the minister’s jurisdiction and 
how much chairs can influence the implementation policies chosen by their 
corresponding ministers.
Although these results are intuitive, there are two caveats to register. First, 
we know little about the precise bargaining protocols that different coalitions 
use to allocate chairs among their members. Thus, although we know that a 
governing party whose members chair three committees probably did not get 
to pick its three highest-value committees, we cannot say much more than 
that. Second, several officers—including junior ministers, lower-house com-
mittee chairs, and upper-house committee chairs—might shadow any given 
minister; but our empirical data (described presently) concern only shadow-
ing by lower-house chairs. The existence of shadowing substitutes will likely 
attenuate any empirical relationship we find between our three predictors and 
shadowing by lower-house committee chairs.3
Given these caveats, in what follows we focus on empirically exploring 
what we believe are plausible conjectures about which ministers will be shad-
owed by lower-chamber chairs. In particular, we expect that the probability 
of a particular government-overseen minister being shadowed increases with 
(a) the average policy distance between the ministerial party and its partners 
(in the ministry’s jurisdiction) and (b) the power of the committee.
Method
To test our hypotheses, we use the following multilevel model:
The dependent variable is coded S
i
 = 1 if government-overseen minister i is 
shadowed (by a lower-house chair), 0 otherwise. The probability of this 
occurrence is a function of (a) a party-specific intercept term, α
j[i]
, where j[i] 
is the party to which minister i belongs; (b) a measure, d
i
, of the policy dis-
tance between minister i’s party and its partners in government; and (c) an 
error term, ε
i
.
ε
i
 ~ N(0, σ2
y
), η
j
 ~ N(0, σ2
α
)
Pr[S
i 
= 1] = logit-1[α
j[i]
 + β
1
d
i
 + ε
i
]
α
j
 = µ
α
 + η
j
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The intercept α
j[i]
 determines the expected probability of minister i being 
shadowed, when the ministerial party, j[i], and its partners are in maximal 
agreement on the policy to be pursued in minister i’s jurisdiction (d
i
 = 0).4  
The variation of the intercept across parties is constrained by the second line 
of the model. In this line, µ
α
 is the average intercept term across all parties 
and η
j
 is a mean-zero error term (independent of the first-level error, ε
i
). As 
σ2
α
→ ∞, the model would place essentially no constraint on what values the 
various α
j
’s can take, and hence there would be virtually no pooling in estimat-
ing the party-specific intercepts. At this extreme, the estimation would be 
equivalent to including J-1 party-specific dummy variables (where J is the 
number of parties). As σ2
α
→ 0, the model would give all parties the same 
intercept. This common intercept would reflect the average shadowing rate 
across all ministers when d
i
 = 0. At this extreme, the estimation would be 
equivalent to an ordinary logit model with α
j[i]
 = α for all j[i].
There are various advantages of using a multilevel model with partial 
pooling, over either the no pooling or complete pooling extremes (cf. Gelman 
& Hill, 2006). In our case, using a multilevel model allows us to include data 
from those parties that have only one government-overseen minister. Using 
traditional fixed-effects logistic regression would necessitate discarding such 
data.5
Operationally, our measure of d
i
 is derived from Benoit and Laver’s (2006) 
survey data set, which provides a “position” score for each party on each of 
several “policy dimensions.” Such dimensions include nationalism, taxing 
and spending, and civil liberties. We mapped each of Benoit and Laver’s 
policy dimensions onto our jurisdictional data, based on the type of issues 
covered by a given ministry in a given case. In cases where ministries dealt 
with more than one policy dimension, we used the average of the distances of 
each dimension for each jurisdiction covered, so that there was only one dis-
tance score per ministry. Generally, ministries were contained within a single 
policy dimension.6 The ministry-level score is based on the absolute distance 
between the minister party and the average position of the partners, which is 
then weighted by Benoit and Laver’s salience measure on the same dimension. 
We rescale the scores to range from 0 to 1, based on the highest value observed 
in a given case. The average distance across ministries is 0.46 (SD = 0.30).
Presumably, if committees have very weak oversight powers, then coali-
tion partners will have little incentive to use their chairs as counterweights to 
ministers: All concerned should recognize that the chairs are too weak. Only 
when committees have some significant oversight powers does one expect 
governing partners to make systematic use of committee chairs as overseers of 
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ministers. To account for this, we classify our cases into those with stronger 
committees and those with weaker committees. A well-known assessment of 
committee legislative powers in Western Europe, that of Strøm (1998, 2000), is 
extended by Yläoutinen and Hallerberg (2008) to include Eastern Europe. 
Yläoutinen and Hallerberg’s index of committee legislative powers assigns 
points when committees are able to initiate legislation, consolidate or split 
legislation, amend legislation, and rewrite government bills. We code a com-
mittee system as “strong(er)” if it scores in the upper half on Yläoutinen and 
Hallerberg’s index and as “weak(er)” otherwise. This dichotomization results 
in a “stronger committee” sample that includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, and 
Sweden.
Findings
The results of our analysis of shadowing are presented in Table 2. We first 
examine a sample of 310 government-overseen ministries, grouped by 96 
Table 2. Shadowing of Ministers (multilevel logit, grouped by ministerial party)
DV = minister is shadoweda (1) (2)
Policy disagreement 1.091** 1.089**
 (0.508) (0.470)
Strong committees 0.905** 0.743**
 (0.389) (0.300)
New democracy 1.016** 0.893***
 (0.405) (0.323)
Minister party’s seat % −7.433***
 (1.202)
Constant −0.999** 0.970**
 (0.429) (0.445)
Random effects  
Random intercept variance 1.26 0.20
 (0.56) (0.28)
Log likelihood −196.3 −176.5
Observations (ministries) 310 310
Groups (parties) 96 96
Standard errors in parentheses.
a.The dependent variable is coded as follows. Shadowed = 0 if the party of the minister holds the 
corresponding committee chair (or at least half of the corresponding chairs for that ministry); 
shadowed = 1 if a corresponding chair is (chairs are) held by a different governing party.
**p < .05. ***p < .01.
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parties. As can be seen, we find that the larger are the policy disagreements 
between the ministerial party and its partners (in the relevant ministry’s juris-
diction), the more likely the minister is to be shadowed by a committee chair 
from a partner party. This pattern suggests, in accordance with our argument 
above, that partners more often balance a minister with a committee chair 
from a different government party when they foresee a greater risk that the 
minister will pursue implementation strategies at variance with coalition-
wide preferences.
We also included a dummy for “stronger” committees, based on the catego-
rization outlined above. We find that the probability of a minister being shad-
owed is greater in systems where committees are more powerful, suggesting 
that such efforts are more prevalent where they are more likely to be 
effective.
Because our sample pools new and established parliamentary democracies, 
we also add a dummy (new democracy) to account for this difference. We find 
that, on average, ministries in new democracies are more likely to be shad-
owed. Because all new democracies in our sample are Eastern European, our 
finding may reflect any of the various factors that distinguish parliamentary 
governments in Eastern Europe from those in Western Europe—which factors 
include not just experience with democratic governance but also communist 
legacies, differential rates of modernization, and so forth (Ágh, 1995; Carey, 
Formanek, & Karpowicz, 2002).
Although we treat the allocation of committee chairs among government 
members as endogenous to coalition preferences, party-level variation in the 
baseline probability of being shadowed remains in the model. In the second 
column of Table 2 we consider whether policy disagreement provides explan-
atory power even when the size of the ministerial party is taken into account. 
Although this variable—the share of seats held by the minister’s party— 
captures most of the cross-group variation in the intercept (and thus the ran-
dom intercept is not significant), the positive effect of policy disagreement 
on the probability a minister is shadowed by a governing partner 
remains in this specification as well.7
Substantively, an average-sized party in an established democracy is 26% 
more likely to be shadowed on a jurisdiction with maximum observed policy 
disagreement than in a jurisdiction with the minimum observed policy dis-
agreement. Given a strong committee system, such a party facing maximum 
policy disagreement has a 67% probability of being shadowed, whereas this 
probability is only 25% when policy disagreement is at its minimum and the 
committee system is weak.
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Conclusion
In this article we study delegation problems within multiparty coalition gov-
ernments. We argue that coalition parties can shadow the ministers of their 
partners; that is, they can appoint committee chairs (or junior ministers) from 
other governing parties, who will then be well placed to monitor and/or check 
the actions of the corresponding ministers.
The previous literature has sought evidence supporting the idea that chairs 
(or junior ministers) are used to monitor ministers by examining the frequency 
of shadowing. If the proportion of ministers facing chairs (or junior ministers) 
of another party is significantly higher than would be expected by chance 
alone, then these studies conclude that the underlying motivation is indeed 
keeping tabs on partners (cf. Kim & Loewenberg, 2005; Thies, 2001). In this 
article, we provide cross-national evidence for the argument suggested by 
Kim and Loewenberg (2005) that committee chairs are assigned strategically 
in addition to, or perhaps as a substitute for, conflict-management and information-
acquisition mechanisms within the executive branch. More importantly, we 
have (a) offered a theory of which ministers should be shadowed, if govern-
ing parties seek to minimize the aggregate policy losses they suffer because of 
ministers pursuing their own parties’ interests rather than the coalition’s, and 
(b) provided evidence consistent with this theory.
We highlight two empirical patterns in particular. First, the greater is the 
policy disagreement between a minister’s party and its partners, the more likely 
the minister is to be shadowed. Second, assemblies that have endowed com-
mittees with the most significant tools to influence legislation have a greater 
overall rate of shadowing among governing partners. Furthermore, this base-
line probability of a given minister being shadowed is higher in the newer 
democracies.
Our study illuminates broader theories of coalition governance. In particu-
lar, the apparent care with which chairs are used to counterbalance ministers 
in many systems suggests the following. First, governing partners fear that 
each other’s ministers will pursue their own interests but take action to reduce 
ministers’ scope for free legislative action. Thus, the Laver-Shepsle (1996) 
model may overstate the extent to which ministers are left as free agents but 
nonetheless identifies an important tendency. Second, to understand the 
determinants of the government agenda in any given polity, it is important to 
consider not just the allocation of ministerial posts but also the allocation of 
legislative posts.
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Appendix
In this appendix we consider the preferences of a party, regarding which 
ministries it should shadow. We assume that each party j in a coalition gov-
ernment has an additively separable utility function over implementation 
outcomes in the jurisdictions covered by the various ministries, i = 1, . . . , 
I. Specifically, if y = (y
1
, . . . , y
I
) is the vector of implementation outcomes 
across all I ministries, then party j’s implementation payoff is u
j
(y) = 
 2, where w
ji
 is the salience of ministry i’s jurisdiction to party 
 j, and ||x – y|| denotes the Euclidian distance between vectors x and y. 
Party j also values holding office per se. The value to party j of the office 
allocations m = (m
1
, . . . , m
I
) and c = (c
1
, . . . , c
I
) is denoted v
j
(m,c). We 
assume that ministry i is worth µ
i
 and chair i is worth κ
i
, so that v
j
(m,c) =, 
 ,where 1
x=y
 equals 1 if x = y and equals 0 otherwise.
Finally, there is also a stochastic component of utility, as party j may value 
the combination of a minister from party m
i
 administering ministry i and a 
chair from party c
i
 overseeing ministry i for reasons unrelated either to 
the policies that such a minister-chair pairing will pursue or to the direct 
“consumption” value of the offices. For example, the administrative compe-
tence and integrity of a particular chair may be important considerations. We 
denote the stochastic component of utility by ε
ji
(m
i
,c
i
) and assume that the 
ε
ji
 are independently and identically distributed normal variates with mean 
zero and variance .5σ2.
Now consider the value to party j of shadowing a particular ministry i 
controlled by party k. How much better will the payoff be for j, when one of 
its own members chairs the committee corresponding to ministry i, rather 
than when one of party k’s members chairs the committee? Denoting this 
value by δ
jik
, we have δ
jik
 = [u
j
(y
1
, . . . , y
i
(k,j), . . . , y
I
) + К
i
 + ε
ji
(k,j)] – [u
j
(y
1
, 
. . . , y
i
(k,k), . . . , y
I
) + ε
ji
(k,k)], where y
i
(k,j) is the outcome in ministry i’s 
jurisdiction when the minister is from party k and the corresponding chair 
is from party j, whereas y
i
(k,k) is the outcome when both the minister and the 
chair are from party k (giving k a clean line of authority). Given the additive 
separability of j’s utility function,
δ
jik
 = w
ji
[||x
ji
 – y
i
(kk)||2 – ||x
ji
 – y
i
(kj)||2] + К
i
 + [ε
ji
(k,j) – ε
ji
(k,k)] (1)
Given that policy outcomes are a weighted average of the chair’s and minis-
ter’s ideal points, we have y
i
(kk) = x
ki
 and y
i
(kj) = λx
ji
 + (1-λ)x
ki
. Substituting 
− −∑w x yji ji i
i
I
|| ||
=1
1 1m j i
i
I
c j ii i=
=
=
+∑ µ κ
1
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in Equation 1 and simplifying yields δ
jik
 = λ (2-λ)w
ji
D
ijk
 + κ
i
 + η
ji
, where 
D
ijk
 = ||x
ji
 – x
ki
||2 is the squared distance between party j’s and party k’s ideal 
points in the jurisdiction of ministry i; and η
ji
 = [ε
ji
(k,j) – ε
ji
(k,k)] ~ N(0,σ). 
If one views the consumption value of chair i, κ
i
, to be proportional to the 
strength of the committee—that is, κ
i
 = γλ for some scalar γ—then,
 δ
jik
 = λ(2-λ)w
ji
D
ijk
 + γλ + η
ji
 (2)
Equation 2 clarifies only which ministries a particular party would prefer 
to shadow, if it had the choice. As chairs are allocated by some bargaining 
process, it is not clear that any particular party’s desires will be met. Also, 
it is not clear how preferences would be affected when multiple means of 
shadowing exist, and whether it would be more valuable to obtain additional 
monitoring of an important minister or initial monitoring of a less important 
minister.
In our empirical work, we use the policy distance variable (or d
i
 in the text) 
to represent the average value of w
ji
D
ijk
 for a given ministry i. Because our 
measure of committee strength is constant within a given country, we include 
a dummy variable for committee strength. We have not found that the coef-
ficient on policy distance is significantly affected by committee strength—
which is perhaps not surprising given the nonlinear relationship implied in 
Equation 2.
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Notes
1. The term shadow minister conventionally refers to a member of an opposition party 
who acts as his or her party’s spokesperson on matters within a given jurisdiction. 
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But it is not just opposition parties that may wish to keep tabs on a minister’s 
actions. Thus, we extend the notion of “shadowing” here to include governing 
partners too.
2. In some cases, we consider two different jurisdictional titles to be effectively syn-
onymous, corresponding to the same jurisdictional area (e.g., if there is a ministry 
of finance and a budget committee, with no other ministries or committees relating 
to state finances or budgets, then we assume that the finance ministry and the bud-
get committee have the same jurisdictional area).
3. Suppose that the probability minister i is shadowed by any means is Pr[S
i,any
 = 1] 
= logit-1[β
1
x
i
], where x
i
 is some regressor and S
i,any
 is a variable indicating whether 
minister i is shadowed. Instead of observing S
i,any
, we observe S
i,lower
, where S
i,lower
 
is a variable indicating whether minister i is shadowed by a lower-chamber chair. 
Suppose next that, conditional on being shadowed by any means, the probability 
of being shadowed by a lower-chamber chair is .5 (or some other fixed constant 
between 0 and 1). In that case, our estimator for the coefficient β
1
 will be biased 
downward (by our inability to observe all means of shadowing).
4. More precisely, this expected probability of being shadowed is logit-1[α
j[i]
].
5. We can report, however, that the results of a fixed effects bivariate regression using 
such a restricted sample of shadowing and policy distance are similar to the results 
reported below.
6. When we were not able to map the Benoit and Laver data onto ministries’ jurisdic-
tions, we excluded them from the analysis.
7. In addition, a party fixed effects model allowing only ministry-level variation 
within parties produces similar results.
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